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Abstract 
 
Christopher D. Williams: Asymmetric Responses to Earnings News: A Case for 
Ambiguity 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman and Wayne R. Landsman) 
 
In this paper I empirically investigate whether investors change the way they 
respond to earnings releases following changes in “ambiguity” in a manner consistent 
with extant research that distinguishes risk from ambiguity. With risk, decision-makers 
possess known probabilities and formulate unique prior distributions over all possible 
outcomes. In contrast, with ambiguity, decision-makers possess incomplete knowledge 
about probabilities and are unable to formulate priors over all possible outcomes. 
Existing theoretical research supports the hypothesis that investors respond differentially 
to good versus bad news information releases when confronted with ambiguity. As a 
proxy for ambiguity I use the volatility index (VIX).  I provide evidence that following 
increases in VIX investors respond asymmetrically, weighting bad earnings news more 
than good earnings news. Conversely, following a decrease in VIX investors respond 
symmetrically to good and bad earnings news. Results are robust to consideration of both 
risk and investor sentiment explanations. I also document that the effect of ambiguity is 
intensified for firms with a high systematic component to earnings, and is mitigated for 
firms with high trading volume over the event window. This study provides large sample, 
empirical evidence that ambiguity changes how market participants process earnings 
information. 
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 I. Introduction 
In this paper, I investigate the role of ambiguity in shaping the responses of stock 
market participants to firm-specific information releases.  Beginning with Knight (1921) 
and later with Ellsberg (1961), a substantial body of literature in economics, finance, and 
decision theory posits a fundamental distinction between risk and ambiguity, and 
examines implications of this distinction for economic decision-making. In settings 
characterized by risk, decision-makers possess known probabilities (objective or 
subjective) and can formulate unique prior distributions over all possible outcomes.1 In 
contrast, in settings with ambiguity, decision-makers possess incomplete knowledge 
about probabilities and are unable or unwilling to formulate a unique prior over all 
possible outcomes. 2
 
 I contribute to the existing literature by empirically examining 
whether investors process information differently following increases in ambiguity than 
following decreases in ambiguity. I provide large sample evidence that following 
increases in ambiguity, investors respond asymmetrically to bad and good news earnings 
announcements, weighting bad news more than the good news. In contrast, decreases in 
ambiguity are followed by symmetric responses to bad and good news. 
                                                 
1  That is, decision-makers are presumed to have preferences that satisfy the Savage (1954) axioms, 
implying that they maximize expected utility with respect to unique prior beliefs. 
 
2 In a classic paper, Ellsberg (1961) provides experimental evidence that the distinction between risk and 
ambiguity is behaviorally meaningful, showing that people treat ambiguous bets differently from risky bets 
(i.e., The Ellsberg Paradox, see appendix A for further details). In this paper I use the term ambiguity to 
characterize settings where there is incomplete knowledge about probabilities. Other terms commonly used 
in the literature are uncertainty, model uncertainty, and Knightian uncertainty.  
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Ambiguity can be conceptualized by assuming that a decision-maker is endowed 
with a set of probability distributions over possible outcomes, and that he is unable or 
unwilling to assess a unique prior over the multiple probability distributions in the set. In 
such a case, ambiguity is represented as a multiplicity of possible probability 
distributions that cannot be reduced to a singleton because of missing information to the 
agent that is relevant.3 In a capital markets setting, such ambiguity could result from 
shocks to the economy that cause investors to become uncertain or fearful as to whether 
they are using an incorrect model to evaluate the future. For example, the behavior of 
market participants during the recent credit crisis can be interpreted in an ambiguity 
framework (e.g., Easley and O’Hara (2008)).4
The economic logic underpinning my predictions derives from Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989), who axiomatize a maxmin expected utility theory in which a 
decision-maker possessing a set of distributions chooses an action that maximizes 
expected utility given the probability weights that represent the worst case scenario from 
  
                                                 
3 See Camerer and Weber (1992) and Frisch and Baron (1988) for further discussion of ambiguity from a 
general, decision theoretic perspective. 
 
4 The following quotes are instructive here: “There has been something deeply disconcerting about the 
negotiations of the past few days in Washington to bail out the U.S. financial system: The best and brightest 
of policy and economic elites have seemed out of their depth. Congressional leaders, senior administration 
officials, top bankers and economists, even the Chairman of the Federal Reserve admit they don’t fully 
understand what’s happening or what to do…And so, what once seemed like manageable risk has mutated 
into unbounded uncertainty.” 
 
-Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Globe and Mail; “It just is something we haven’t seen in our lifetimes, so it’s 
hard to tell exactly where we are.” -Tom Forester, Associated Press Newswire, referring to the financial 
crises of 2008. 
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the entire set of potential probabilities.5
In this paper, I hypothesize that following increases in ambiguity, stock price 
reactions to earnings releases reflect investors weighting bad news earnings more heavily 
than good news earnings, and following decreases in ambiguity, stock price reactions 
reflect investors symmetrically weighting bad and good news earnings.
 Under this theory, ambiguity induces ambiguity 
averse agents to act very cautiously, or even pessimistically, and choose the worst-case 
beliefs from the set of possible probability measures. As I describe in detail next, such 
behavior can lead investors to respond differentially to good versus bad news information 
releases when confronted with ambiguity.   
6
First, Epstein and Schneider (2008) model the possibility that financial market 
participants have incomplete information with respect to the precision of future 
information signals.  Investors know that true precision is contained in a set of possible 
precisions, but cannot assess a unique prior over this set. The wider the range of possible 
signal precisions contained in the investor’s set, the greater the ambiguity. With respect 
to earnings releases, such ambiguity could result from a lack of confidence on the part of 
investors in their ability to interpret the implications of current earnings signals for future 
cash flows in an uncertain environment. For example, investors may become uncertain 
about how to interpret earnings from mark-to-market accounting adjustments in chaotic 
asset markets. Now, following maxmin logic, investors optimize expected utility given 
  Two recent 
theories are particularly pertinent to the formulation of my hypothesis.  
                                                 
5 Epstein and Schneider (2003) extend Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to an inter-temporal setting. Ahn 
(2008) points out that under the maxmin expected utility theory ambiguity is subjective ambiguity in 
reference to Savage (1954). Ahn (2008) and others model a form of objective ambiguity 
6 Throughout the paper I use ‘changes in ambiguity’ and ‘ambiguity shock’ interchangeably.  
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the worst case precision from the set of possible precisions. Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
show that if investors observe a bad news signal, they assume the signal’s precision is the 
highest possible in their subjective set, and react strongly by placing more weight on the 
high precision signal.  On the other hand, if the signal is good news, they assume the 
lowest possible precision in their set, generating a muted response to the low precision 
signal.   
Second, consider the following quote from Hansen and Sargent (2008): “A 
pessimist thinks that good news is temporary but that bad news will endure.”  This quote 
suggests the possibility that ambiguity can affect the way investors assess the 
implications of current earnings for the future wealth generating process. Hansen and 
Sargent (2008) model investors as having incomplete information about the underlying 
wealth-creating process, and as a result they face a range of possible models with 
differing persistence properties that cannot be statistically separated by an econometrician 
given a finite sample. Asymmetric responses to good and bad news is driven by the way 
investors cope with uncertainty about the competing models of wealth creation. In 
Hansen and Sargent (2008), negative signals lead ambiguity-averse investors to slant 
their probability assessments towards the most pessimistic underlying model where such 
negative shocks are persistent, while good news signals push assessments towards a 
model with low persistence.  Building on this economic logic, if ambiguity-averse 
investors observe a bad news earnings signal during times of significant ambiguity, they 
pessimistically slant towards the worst-case model with the highest persistence, and thus 
react strongly to the signal as they assess such bad news to have significant, ongoing 
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effects.  On the other hand, if the signal is good news, they move towards a model where 
the persistence of the signal is low, and respond weakly to the signal.   
Before proceeding, I want to stress that empirical research on ambiguity in capital 
markets is in its infancy, and my hypotheses are necessarily exploratory in nature. Thus, 
while I am not able to distinguish between these two particular theories at this time, I 
argue that these theories provide two intuitive and plausible mechanisms that could drive 
the predicted asymmetric responses to bad and good news signals, and as such represent a 
useful point of departure for empirical explorations of ambiguity.  
Central to my empirical design is a measure of changes in ambiguity prior to 
earnings announcements. While conceptually the level of ambiguity and changes in 
ambiguity lead to similar predictions in a one period model, sustained levels of ambiguity 
lead to different predictions in a multi-period model. Epstein and Schneider (2008) point 
out the importance of ambiguity shocks when empirically studying ambiguity, because 
agents are in novel environments. Therefore, I measure changes in ambiguity using 
changes in the volatility index (VIX) over the two-day window prior to the earnings 
announcement window.  VIX is computed daily by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
and is the weighted average of implied 30 day volatility of the S&P 100 stocks as 
reflected in index option prices.7
                                                 
7 Although throughout the paper I refer to VIX as the implied volatility of the S&P 100, the actual ticker of 
the index is the VXO. The true VIX is a market free model of implied volatility on the S&P 500. I use the 
prior measure because the time series is longer, but my results are not sensitive to the use of the true VIX. 
 Although it is not obvious how to empirically measure 
ambiguity, I argue that VIX is an important and useful starting point. A recent paper by 
Drechsler (2008) posits and provides evidence that VIX contains an important ambiguity-
related component. The essence of his model is that options provide investors with a 
6 
 
natural protection against uncertainty (ambiguity) and as a result, time-variation in 
uncertainty concerns is strongly reflected in option premia, and thus in VIX. An 
alternative measure of ambiguity, the dispersion in macro forecasts, is used in Anderson 
et al. (2008). However, as shown by Drechsler (2008), the dispersion of macro forecasts 
is highly correlated with VIX.  It is also the case that macro forecasts dispersion is not 
available on a daily basis, which is a key element of my empirical design. 
My empirical design focuses on the three-day return window centered on 
quarterly earnings announcement dates. I estimate the elasticity of stock returns to 
negative and positive earnings news, conditioning on whether VIX increased or 
decreased in the two days just prior to the earnings announcement window. The strategy 
is to test for differences in the magnitude of bad news coefficients relative to good news 
coefficients after increases and decreases in VIX.  
Using quarterly earnings announcements from 1986-2006, I find evidence 
consistent with changes in ambiguity affecting investor responses to information releases. 
Specifically, immediately following an increase (decrease) in VIX there is an asymmetric 
(symmetric) response to quarterly earnings news.  Increases (decreases) in VIX result in 
larger (equal) responses to bad news relative to good news.   
I further examine whether the documented asymmetry (symmetry) following 
increases (decreases) in VIX is a picking up another existing phenomenon or is an 
orthogonal phenomenon. I specifically test to see if the result is robust to leverage 
effects/volatility feedback effects (Black, 1976; Christie, 1984; Schwert, 1989, Bekaert 
and Wu, 2000), the market-to-book effect (i.e., the ‘torpedo effect’) (Skinner and Sloan, 
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2002), investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Livnat and Petrovits, 2008; Mian 
and Sankaraguruswamy, 2008) or investor perceptions of the state of the economy 
(Veronesi, 1999; Conrad, Cornell and Landsman, 2002).  
I next investigate the possibility that some firms are more susceptible to the 
effects of ambiguity than others. Given that VIX is a macro-economic variable, I 
investigate the extent to which the effect of ambiguity (i.e., higher response to bad news 
relative to good news) varies cross-sectionally with two measures of the firm’s 
connections with macro fluctuations. I consider both the extent to which firms’ earnings 
co-vary with aggregate market earnings, and the extent to which stock returns co-vary 
with changes in VIX. I find that the effects of increases in ambiguity are more 
pronounced for firms with high earnings betas, and for firms whose returns are most 
sensitive to changes in VIX.  
Finally, I explore the interplay of ambiguity with trading volume and bid-ask 
spreads. The literature suggests a connection between ambiguity and both trading volume 
and bid-ask spreads (Bewley, 2002; Dow and Werlang, 1992; Epstein and Schneider, 
2007 and Easley and O’Hara, 2008, Easley and O’Hara, 2009). I document that the 
asymmetric responses to bad earnings news relative to good news following an increase 
in VIX are much stronger for firms with relatively low abnormal trading volume during 
the earnings announcement window. This is consistent with Epstein and Schneider (2007) 
who show in an inter-temporal portfolio choice model that an increase in ambiguity (i.e., 
an increase in the set of possible distributions) leads investors to trend away from stock 
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market participation. I also find that after controlling for the earnings surprise, there is a 
substantial increase in bid-ask spreads following increases in VIX.).  
Beginning with Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), accounting research 
has studied how the market responds to accounting information (Atiase, 1985, 1987; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Freeman and Tse, 1992; 
Kormendi and Lipe, 1989; Lang, 1992; Subramanyam, 1996; see Kothari (2001) for a 
review). Typically, this stream of research assumes that investors’ preferences conform to 
the standard subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954). This paper contributes 
to this literature by providing empirical evidence that investors on average appear to 
make a distinction between risk and ambiguity in the context of earnings announcements, 
investors are averse to ambiguity and that investor preferences do not conform to those of 
Savage (1954). It also provides important insight into furthering our understanding of 
how the market’s response to earnings information is a function of the context in which 
the information is received.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 develops the 
conceptual framework on the effects of ambiguity on decision making. Section 3 explains 
the data. Section 4 reports the primary results and test for alternative explanations. 
Section 5 examines cross-sectional variation in ambiguity susceptibility. Section 6 
examines the interplay between ambiguity and trading volume and the effects of 
ambiguity on bid-ask spread. Section 7 concludes the study. 
  
 II. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
2.1 Hypothesis 1 
As noted in the introduction, I hypothesize that following increases in ambiguity, 
stock price reactions to earnings releases weight bad news earnings more heavily than 
good news earnings, and following decreases in ambiguity, stock price reactions 
symmetrically weight bad and good news earnings. The economic logic underpinning this 
hypothesis is extracted from two recent papers.   
First, Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider the possibility that investors know 
that the true precision of future information signals is contained in a set of possible 
precisions, but cannot assess priors over this set. The wider the range of possible signal 
precisions contained in the investor’s set, the greater the ambiguity. To be concrete, 
consider that 𝜈𝜈 is a parameter that investors want to learn, but that they only observe the 
noisy signal 𝑠𝑠 = 𝜈𝜈 + 𝜖𝜖.  The key to the ambiguity notion is the noise term 𝜖𝜖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2), 
where 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2  ∈ �𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2�. That is, the signal s is related to the parameter 𝜈𝜈 by a family of 
likelihoods characterized by a range of precisions �1/𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2, 1/𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2�.  Following Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Schneider (2003), an ambiguity-averse agent will 
behave as if he maximizes expected utility under a worst-case belief that is chosen from a 
set of conditional probabilities.  That is, agents evaluate any action using the conditional 
probability that minimizes the utility of that action. In the model of Epstein and 
Schneider (2008), when an ambiguous signal conveys bad news, the worst case is that the 
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signal is very reliable (i.e., precision = 1/𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2) and the investor responds strongly, and vice 
versa for good signals (i.e., precision = 1/𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2). 8
Ambiguity with respect to the precision of earnings releases can potentially result 
when an economic shock creates a lack of confidence by investors resulting in a 
reduction of investor confidence in interpreting the implications of earnings signals (e.g., 
signal interpretation a la Kim and Verrecchia (1994)). For example, consider the model 
of Kim and Verrecchia (1994). While it is not modeled in Epstein and Schneider (2008), 
an alternative formulation that also supports my hypothesis is to assume that an economic 
shock creates ambiguity with respect to the volatility of the fundamentals.
  
9
The second basis for my hypothesis is consistent with the following quote from 
Hansen and Sargent (2008): “A pessimist thinks that good news is temporary but that bad 
   That is, 
rather than ambiguity with respect to precision of the signal, allow for ambiguity with 
respect to the variance of the fundamentals. In terms of the example in the previous 
paragraph, let the fundamental  𝜈𝜈~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2) , where 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2  ∈ �𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2,𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2� .  Now, recalling 
𝐸𝐸[𝜈𝜈|𝑠𝑠] = 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀
2+𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 ∗ 𝑠𝑠 (see footnote 8), if s<0, the most pessimistic response is achieved by 
assuming that 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 = 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 , which makes the coefficient on s as high as possible.  The 
assumption that 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 = 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2  is equivalent to assuming that the signal is very informative 
with respect to the fundamentals, 𝜈𝜈 (and vice versa for s>0 where 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 = 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2).   
                                                 
8 To see this simply, assume 𝐸𝐸[𝑠𝑠] = 0, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐, 𝜖𝜖) = 0 and note that 𝐸𝐸[𝑐𝑐|𝑠𝑠] = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐,𝑠𝑠)
𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 (𝑠𝑠) ∗ 𝑠𝑠 = 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐2𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2+𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐2 ∗ 𝑠𝑠.  If 
s<0, the most pessimistic response is achieved by assuming that 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2, which makes the coefficient on s 
as high as possible, and if s>0, the most pessimistic response is achieved by assuming that  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2 which 
makes the coefficient on s as low as possible 
 
9 Epstein and Schneider (2008) allow for ambiguity with respect to the mean of the fundamentals, not the 
volatility.  See also Caskey (2008) on this point.  
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news will endure.”  Hansen and Sargent (2008) model a representative consumer who 
evaluates consumption streams in light of model selection and parameter estimation 
problems. The consumer is uncertain as to which model governs future consumption 
growth. One model exhibits persistence in information shocks, while the other model 
does not.  The arrival of signals induces the consumer to alter his posterior distribution 
over models and parameters. However, due to specification doubts (ambiguity), the 
consumer updates his priors over models by slanting probabilities pessimistically. That is, 
negative signals lead a cautious consumer to slant his probability assessments towards the 
most pessimistic underlying model where such negative shocks are persistent, while good 
news signals push assessments towards a model with low persistence.  While this is a 
representative consumer model focused on the macro economy and thus does not speak 
directly to firm-specific earnings announcements, the possibility that macro shocks could 
cause investors to be uncertain about the persistence of current earnings seems at least 
plausible, especially if the firm’s underlying wealth generating process is highly 
connected to the macro economy. I address this conjecture in Section 5.  If investors 
observe a bad news earnings signal, they pessimistically slant towards the worst-case 
model with the highest persistence and react strongly to the signal.  On the other hand, if 
the signal is good news, they move towards a model where the persistence of the signal is 
low and so respond weakly to the signal.    
Given the above arguments and motivation I formalize my predictions in the 
following hypothesis stated in the null: 
H1a: Ambiguity causes stock price responses to be symmetric for 
negative and positive unexpected earnings. 
12 
 
H1b:  The lack of ambiguity causes stock price responses to be symmetric 
for negative and positive unexpected earnings. 
 
Before preceding it is important make two points, first I want to point out that the 
theory literature on ambiguity is evolving, and that there exists models of ambiguity that 
do not lead to an asymmetric response to bad and good news signals.  In a recent paper, 
Caskey (2008) models ambiguity in information signals using an alternative formulation 
to that of Epstein and Schneider (2008).  Caskey (2008) models ambiguity-averse 
preferences using Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) characterization of 
ambiguity aversion, and assumes that investors face ambiguity with respect to the 
unknown mean of the noise term in the information signal. In this model, prices do not 
respond asymmetrically to good and bad news signals. Ultimately, empirical evidence is 
needed to more fully understand the role, if any, of ambiguity in capital markets. I 
contribute to this process with my empirical analysis.  Second, the above hypotheses are 
stated in a levels framework, yet as mentioned in the introduction I test a changes 
specification. The next section explains my both my motivation for the changes 
specification and the restated hypotheses.   
2.2 Level verses Changes, the Empirical Proxy for Ambiguity and H1* 
 Perhaps one of the largest obstacles preventing empirical research from 
investigating the effects of ambiguity on capital markets is the availability of proxies for 
ambiguity. Anderson et al. (2008) use as a proxy for variation in ambiguity the quarterly 
dispersion in professional forecasters. However I do not use this measure because to 
whatever degree it measure the ambiguity in the market it does so in an untimely manner 
13 
 
making it hard to quantify on a given day during the interim investors’ decision 
environment.  
Drechsler (2008) posits and provides evidence that VIX contains an important 
ambiguity-related component. Key to the study is the empirical observation that index 
options are priced with positive premia, implying that buyers of index options pay a large 
hedging premium. 10   Drechsler (2008) analyzes and calibrates a general equilibrium 
model incorporating time-varying Knightian uncertainty regarding economic 
fundamentals.11 The model shows that options provide investors with a natural protection 
against ambiguity, and as a result, time-variation in uncertainty is strongly reflected in 
option premia and in VIX.12 More importantly for my study Drechsler (2008) shows the 
dispersion in macro forecasts are highly correlated with the level of VIX.13
                                                 
10 A measure of this premium is the variance premium, which is defined as the difference between the 
option-implied (VIX), and the statistical (true) expectation of one-month return variance, for which a 
typical proxy is realized return volatility that is computed by using five minute trading intervals over the 
course of the month. 
 The extent to 
which VIX actually captures the underlying ambiguity construct is an open question. I 
argue, however, that it is very useful starting point for empirical investigations of the 
extent to which ambiguity affects observable decision making. 
 
11 For this paper I use the change in VIX instead of the premium as in Drechsler (2008). Ex ante the choice 
of VIX unadjusted for realized volatility does not provide any obvious bias, it does however increase the 
level of noise in my measure. To mitigate the possibility that changes in VIX do not capture some other 
phenomenon, I conduct robustness tests that include investor sentiment and risk. 
 
12 An alternative argument for the use of VIX as a proxy for ambiguity is one can think of ambiguity as 
being “…created by missing information that is relevant and could be known” (Frisch and Baron, 1988). 
One of the byproducts of such a situation is that not knowing the information is both upsetting and scary 
(Camerer and Weber, 1992). Another name for the VIX is ‘the fear index’, and recent anecdotal evidence 
during the credit crisis suggests that investors pay attention to the VIX when they are fearful and uncertain. 
 
13 Andersen et al. (2008) suggests that in addition to the dispersion of macro forecasters, firm specific 
forecast dispersion may also provide a firm specific measure of ambiguity.  To the extent it is correlated 
with macro ambiguity it may have implications for asset pricing. Untabulated findings indicate that changes 
in VIX are positively correlated with analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. 
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Unlike the dispersion in macro forecast the VIX is computed daily by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange and is the weighted average of implied 30 day volatility of the 
S&P 100 stocks as reflected in index option prices (see Whaley (2000) for further 
details). In Figure 1 panel A, the times series of the VIX index is plotted over my sample 
period. Descriptively the VIX index is always strictly greater than zero with a mean over 
the period of 20.37% and a standard deviation of 8.11%. An additional important and 
well documented property of the VIX is that it is persistent. Empirically the level of the 
VIX has shown to have a large first-order autocorrelation of approximately 95%. 
While the use of the VIX allows one more frequent intervals of measurement the 
use of the level of VIX is problematic for the purposes of my study. One of the key 
propositions put forth in the above section is that the same information can be processed 
differently depending on whether the environment is characterized by ambiguity or risk. 
It is also reasonable to assume that ambiguity would affect more than investors decision 
making process but also the signal generating process. While the response to ambiguity is 
immediate for individual agents (i.e., investors, managers, analysts) the accounting 
information system will capture the effects of ambiguity with a lag. This means not only 
can the signal be affected by ambiguity but also the response to the information at the 
time of the announcement depending on the interim information flows.  
As documented above the level of the VIX is persistent and therefore any given 
level could have existed prior to the measurement for a significant duration of time 
thereby influencing the signal generation process. Prior literature (Heath and Tversky, 
1991; Epstein and Schneider, 2007; 2008) suggest that often the effects of ambiguity as 
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most pronounced when there is an ambiguity shock that forces decision makers to make 
decisions in an unfamiliar environment. Such shocks to decision makers would be 
unpredictable. While the level of VIX has a high autocorrelation the change in VIX does 
not. Figure 1 panel b plots the two-day changes in VIX over the sample period. The mean 
of the series is 0.0018 with a standard deviation of 3.16%. More importantly the first-
order autocorrelation of the change in VIX is basically zero (less than 0.0001). Using 
two-day changes in the VIX allows me to shocks at high frequency, in addition I am able 
to hold the signal relatively constant because I can measure the shock after the earnings 
reports are generated but before the public release of the information. 
 As a partitioning variable in my study I use the two-day change in the VIX 
immediately preceding the announcement window, more specifically I partition the data 
into increases and decreases in the VIX. As shown above increases/decreases in the VIX 
have no autocorrelation but does splitting on increases and decreases accomplish the goal 
of holding the signal constant. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for firms in the 
increase in VIX (∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+) and decrease in VIX (∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−). The first thing that is evident is 
that ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+sample is for the most part not significantly different from the ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉− sample, 
more importantly bad news (BadNews) and good news (GoodNews) is both not 
statistically (or economically) different from each other.14
Conceptually both levels and changes in ambiguity give similar predictions, 
specifically increases in ambiguity will lead to asymmetry in responses to good and bad 
news, and decreases in ambiguity will lead to less asymmetry or even symmetry (as 
 
                                                 
14 In unreported results the same descriptive statistics are run splitting on median level of VIX. Consistent 
with my argument with the exception of Ret all other characteristics are both statistically (at the <0.001 
level) and economically different across the low and high VIX groups.  
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opposed to strict symmetry) in responses to good and bad news holding the level of 
ambiguity constant. While ideally I would like a measure that would allow me to turn on 
and off ambiguity. In considering the trade-offs between using a changes vs. levels 
specification, the benefit of being able to control the inputs in the decision process in a 
change specification seems a more powerful specification give the imperfections in the 
empirical measure. Therefore I modify H1a and H1b in terms of changes, specifically I 
put forth and test the following stated again in the null: 
H1a*: Increase is Ambiguity causes stock price responses to be 
symmetric for negative and positive unexpected earnings. 
H1b*:  Decreases in ambiguity causes stock price responses to be 
symmetric for negative and positive unexpected earnings. 
 
2.3 Ambiguity, Participation and Trading Volume 
Finally, it is useful to ask whether the asymmetric reactions to good and bad news 
predicted by ambiguity represent trading opportunities that are left unexploited.  In the 
models of Epstein and Schneider (2008), Hansen and Sargent (2008) and others, there are 
only ambiguity-averse traders in the model. Since all traders are uncertain about the 
probability structure of the model, there is no one to take advantage of “over-reactions” 
or “under-reactions” to information signals. It is presumed in these models that no market 
participant is able to resolve ambiguity with a finite sample of past observations, so 
everyone is in the same situation. In contrast Caskey (2008) and Easley and O’Hara 
(2009) allows for both ambiguity-averse and Bayesian (or ambiguity neutral) traders 
simultaneously. In Caskey (2008), ambiguity-averse traders choose aggregated 
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information to mitigate ambiguity, while Bayesian traders choose disaggregated signals. 
In equilibrium, the better informed Bayesians do exploit ambiguity-averse traders, but the 
gain to ambiguity-aversion from ambiguity mitigation outweighs the losses to better 
informed Bayesians. Easley and O’Hara (2009) take a different approach by using the 
non-participation results of Dow and Werlang (1992). Easley and O’Hara (2009) show 
that when there is non-participation by ambiguity averse investor the Bayesian cannot 
fully eliminate the pricing effects of the ambiguity averse investors because arbitrage 
cannot correct the non-participation effect of risk-sharing.  
In section 6 of my paper, I explore this issue by examining the relation between 
ambiguity and trading volume.  A number of papers in the literature show that ambiguity 
reduces market participation, or trading, by ambiguity-averse investors (e.g., Dow and 
Werlang, 1992; Epstein and Schneider, 2007; and Easley and O’Hara, 2008, Easley and 
O’Hara, 2009).  In structuring my empirical design, I conceptualize ambiguity as being 
driven by missing information (about probabilities, models, etc.).  If no traders are in 
possession of the missing information and all traders are ambiguity-averse, then there is 
no one available to arbitrage, and I conjecture that following increases in ambiguity, 
firms with relatively low trading volume will have the most pronounced asymmetric 
responses to bad versus good news.  In contrast, if some (ambiguity-averse) traders are 
able to find the missing information following an increase in ambiguity, they will trade 
on this information and drive the ambiguity effects out. Alternatively in a Easley and 
O’Hara (2009) world if there currently exists a state of nonparticipation the discovery of 
information that resolves the ambiguity eliminates the ambiguity effects because it bring 
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ambiguity averse investor back into the market and increases the risk-sharing. Either way, 
I conjecture that following increases in ambiguity, firms with relatively high trading 
volume will have muted asymmetric responses to bad versus good news. 
2.4 Market Response to Earnings News 
 The primary research design to capture the differential responses to good and bad 
earnings news is adopted from Conrad et al. (2002).  
         𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  (1) 
 
where Ret is equal to the three day (𝑅𝑅 − 1 to 𝑅𝑅 + 1) cumulative market adjusted return for 
the firm and t is the reported earnings announcement date. BADNEWS and GOODNEWS 
are constructed by first computing the firm’s seasonally adjusted unexpected earnings 
(UE) scaled by average total assets.  BADNEWS (GOODNEWS) is equal to UE when UE 
< (>) 0 and 0 otherwise. Interpretation of the coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸  in (1) is the market’s 
response to bad news and 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸  is the market’s response to good news.  
To test for the effects of changes in ambiguity I measure changes in VIX just 
prior to the release of the earnings information. I estimate Model (1) for both increases in 
VIX (∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+) and decreases in VIX (∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) to test whether differential responses to bad 
and good earnings news by the market varies with changes in the sign of ambiguity. To 
examine the asymmetry in responses I use three different methods. In the first test I 
compare the coefficients on BADNEWS and GOODNEWS within the partition follow 
Conrad et al. (2002) using an F-Test of whether the coefficients on BADNEWS and 
GOODNEWS are equal. The second test examines whether there is a significant change 
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in the individual coefficient moving from ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−   to  ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ . To carry out this 
comparison the following regression is run in a pool:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∗
∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∗ ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
 
where BADNEWS/GOODNEWS is deifined as in (1) and ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the change in the VIX is positive and 0 otherwise. I then use the coefficients 
𝛽𝛽4 and 𝛽𝛽5  to test whether there is a difference between the responses to 
BADNEWS/GOODNEWS across  ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−  and  ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ . The third and final test of 
asymmetry looks at where the difference between 𝛽𝛽1 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽2 in (1) for the  ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ group 
is different than the 𝛽𝛽1 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽2  in (1) for the ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−  group. To test this difference in 
differences I use the non-parametric approach of randomization tests. For each iteration I 
randomly assign firm quarter observations to either the ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+or ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉− group. I then 
calculate the difference in differences. This is done 1000 times to create and empirical 
distribution. The distribution of difference in differences is then ranked and I then 
observe how many values from the empirical distribution are greater than the actual 
observed difference in differences.  
 Although (1) provides the foundational empirical model that is used in the 
primary test in this paper, I also include a size variable (Size)as a control for potential size 
bias (Barth and Kallapr, 1996). Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal quarter. I also include the 
average level of the VIX over the prior week. Because I use a seasonally adjusted random 
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walk as a proxy for news it is possible that intrim events could have adjusted what is 
really news. If that is the case then this would be picked up in the firm’s prior return to 
the event window. I include the firm prior return over the prior quarter to capture such 
situations. I also include year fixed effects15
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅 +
𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀     (3) 
 and cluster my standard errors on both the 
firm and time dimension. The inclusion of these variables results in the following 
empirical model: 
  
                                                 
15 In results not presented I also include Industry fixed effects and results are robust. 
 III. Data 
I collect firm and market securities data from the CRSP database. Financial 
accounting data along with the earnings announcement dates are obtained from the 
Compustat quarterly file. I collect analyst data from I/B/E/S. VIX data are collected from 
the CBOE website beginning in 1986 which is the first year that historical measures of 
the VIX time series begins. I require firms listed in Compustat to have all needed 
financial data and quarterly announcement dates.  
I further require sample firms to be actively traded over the entire event window. 
Following Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1993) observations with price less than or equal to 
$5 were deleted to minimize the effects of market frictions. To reduce the possibility that 
findings are driven by illiquidity, following Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) I eliminate 
any observations that in the week prior to the event window had more than two 
consecutive days of zero trading, because of the low probability of such events being 
random. To further reduce the effects of outliers, I delete firms with negative book value 
of equity (Barth et al., 1998).16
To reduce the effects of extreme outliers, following Conrad et al. (2002) firms 
that have the ratio of earnings to market capitalization greater than one on the 
announcement day are deleted. All firm level variables are then trimmed at the 1 and 99 
  
                                                 
16  Untabulated results indicate that inferences are unchanged if each of the restrictions is not imposed. As 
robustness I also delete all earnings surprises greater than (less than) 0.5 (-0.5) were deleted (Conrad et al., 
2002) to control for outliers and inferences are not changed. Also prior research indicates that the responses 
to earnings is essentially zero for firms reporting negative earnings (Hayn, 1995), for robustness I delete 
observation with negative level of earnings (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 1998) and inferences are not 
affected. 
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percentiles. Because of the nature of the BADNEWS and GOODNEWS, BADNEWS is 
trimmed at the 1st percentile, while GOODNEWS is trimmed at the 99th percentile. I also 
require that the firm quarter observation have the required variables for all analyses 
throughout the paper.17
  
 The final sample after all of the restrictions are imposed consists 
of 50,978 firm quarter announcements over the period 1986-2007.  
                                                 
17 The one exception is the sentiment index which I do not require because the time series of the variable 
ends in 2005. 
 4.   Primary Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the samples of ΔVIX− and ΔVIX+. As 
pointed out in section 2.2 in both samples good and bad earnings news are statistically 
and economically not different. The mean market adjust return is significantly lower (11 
basis point over the three-day window) for the ΔVIX+ group which is preliminary 
evidence of a change in market reactions to news given that the news distributions are the 
same. In addition to the news variables the univariates in the Table 1 suggests that with 
the exception of Size, Analyst and 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  the characteristics of the firms in the two 
samples are indistinguishable both statistically and economically. While Size, Analyst and 
𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  are statistically different, the economic significance is questionable. For example 
the economic difference in Size between the two groups comes out roughly to be around 
$100 million in market cap. Regardless of the economic significance I control for the size 
in all regressions and include the other two in a robustness check. 
Table 1 also reports two macro-level variables, VIX and RetMrkt. Both of these 
variables are significant lower for the ΔVIX+ group. The significant lower market return 
is to be expected. Prior research and documented the empirical relation that contemporary 
increases in the VIX is strongly associated with negative contemporary market returns. 
This empirical observation is more fully addressed in section 4.2.1. 
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4.1  H1* – Asymmetric Responses to Changes in VIX (Ambiguity) 
Table 2, Column I, presents the initial results from estimations relating to 
increases (∆VIX+) and decreases (∆VIX−) in VIX prior to the earnings report. The 
reported BADNEWS coefficient for the ΔVIX+ partition is 0.9359 and the GOODNEWS 
coefficient is 0.5997, and both the BADNEWS and GOODNEWS coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. To test the asymmetry in the coefficients in each group, 
I first test whether the BADNEWS and GOODNEWS coefficients in each partition are 
different from each other. As report in Table 2 the 0.3362 difference between the 
BADNEWS and GOODNEWS coefficients is significantly different from the other (F-stat 
of 6.4, p-value < 0.001). This first test shows that within the ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ (∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) group there 
is an asymmetric (symmetric) response by the market, responding more (similar) to bad 
news than good news. 
The second test of asymmetry is the test of whether the difference in differences is 
different between ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 groups. Using randomization test the 0.3623 difference in 
differences is significantly different at the 0.01 level. The results from this test provide 
evidence that there is a difference in the asymmetry between the two groups. This 
observed difference in asymmetry across increases and decreases in VIX makes it 
interesting to understand whether the difference in difference is coming about in a 
manner consistent with the theory. The last test examines the change in the BADNEWS 
and GOODNEWS coefficients moving from the decrease in VIX group to the increase in 
VIX group. The analysis in Table 2 column I shows that there is a significant increase in 
the BADNEWS coefficient when moving from the decrease in VIX environment to an 
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increase in VIX environment. This is consistent with investors placing more weight on 
bad news. The second part of the test shows that the GOODNEWS coefficient while not 
statistically significant is decreasing when moving from the decrease in VIX group to the 
increase in VIX group. The decrease in the GOODNEWS coefficient is also consistent 
with the theory of ambiguity place less weight on the good news. 
To check the robustness of the results in column I, I also include a control 
variable for the information environment and distress. As an information environment 
proxy I include the number of analysts (Analyst) that cover the firm prior to the earnings 
announcement. Analyst is calculated by counting the number of analyst reported in the 
I/B/E/S database making forecasts for the current quarterly earnings announcement over 
the prior quarter. If there are no forecast or the firm is not found in I/B/E/S I assign the 
value of zero for the firm quarter observation. To control for distress I include the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio (MTB). Column II in Table 2 reports the coefficients from the 
regression after the inclusion of MTB and Analyst. Results are consistent with those found 
in column I.   
To examine whether the effects of changes in VIX on the response to earnings 
news  extends to the magnitude of VIX changes in addition to the sign of changes, I rank 
changes in VIX into quintiles and estimate (3) for each of the quintiles. The coefficients 
for the estimation by quintile are plotted in Figure 2. As a point of reference, the mean 
change in VIX in the 3rd quintile is not statistically nor economically different from zero, 
while the  mean change for the 2nd (4th) quintile is significantly less (greater) than zero.  
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The plots of the coefficients show that essentially the BADNEWS and 
GOODNEWS coefficients move together for decreases in VIX but then the coefficients 
begin to diverge as VIX increases. Figure 2 also shows that it is only for the extreme 
increases in VIX that there is an asymmetry in the response to earnings news as indicated 
by the solid markers. These two results are important because it shows that not all 
increases in VIX have a similar impact on market responses to earnings news. A 
relatively small change in VIX does not imply a change in ambiguity. Instead the data 
suggest that it is only in the extreme increases in VIX that seem to capture the ambiguity 
shocks. 
The findings in Table 2 along with findings in Figure 1 allow me to first reject the 
null of H1a* and fail to reject H1b* which is consistent with the ambiguity predictions. In 
particular, holding signal realization constant, following increases in VIX there is an 
asymmetric response to information i.e., the market weights bad news more than good 
news. And that this increasing (decreasing) weight on bad (good) news is monotonic in 
increasing VIX environments.  However, following a decrease in VIX, the weights on 
good and bad news are equal. Thus, ambiguity shocks change investors’ decision making 
process consistent with maxmin utility theory.   
4.2 Alternative Explanations 
 Table 2 provides primary evidence that following increase (decrease) in VIX 
immediately prior to the earnings news window. However there are plausible alternative 
explanations that I will examine below. Specifically I investigate and attempt to rule out 
leverage effects and volatility feedback effects. I then address three additional alternative 
27 
 
explanations: the torpedo effect, state-risk and investor sentiment. To attempt to rule out 
these explanations I change my empirical design and adopt the following regression 
model: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼4∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 ∗
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼5∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ∗
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵+𝛼𝛼8𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀 (4) 
 
where ΔVIX is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two-day change in the VIX 
immediately preceding the event window is positive, and 0 otherwise. The primary 
interest in (4) are two-fold, first the signs on 𝛼𝛼4 and 𝛼𝛼5 where the prediction would be 
𝛼𝛼4  > 0 and α5  < 0. The second interest is whether 𝛼𝛼4 + 𝛼𝛼2 ≥ 𝛼𝛼5 + 𝛼𝛼3 , if  𝛼𝛼4 + 𝛼𝛼2 >
𝛼𝛼5 + 𝛼𝛼3  then I can interpret the results as evidence that increases in the VIX lead to 
asymmetric response after controlling for other potential factors that may create 
asymmetry in the response to bad and good news.  
4.2.1 Leverage and Feedback Effects 
Prior literature has long been interested in the empirical observation of 
asymmetric volatility (Black, 1976 and Christie, 1982), where conditional variance of 
next periods returns are negatively correlated with the current period return. Often the 
literature attributes this phenomenon to one of the following: leverage effects (Black, 
1976; Christie, 1982; Schwert, 1989; Duffie, 1995), volatility feedback (French, Schwert, 
and Stambaugh, 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) or a combination of both (Bekaert 
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and Wu, 2000; Wu, 2001). One potential concern is that the asymmetric responses 
documented in Table 2 are a manifestation of the asymmetric volatility phenomenon.  
 Bekaert and Wu (2000) provide a unified framework that allows one to consider 
both the leverage and volatility feedback effects at the firm level. Their framework is 
based off to assumptions: first, the CAPM holds and second, the documented empirical 
observation that volatility is persistent. The primary result that comes from their paper is 
that market level bad (good) news leads larger (smaller) negative correlation between 
contemporaneous returns and conditional volatility at the firm level through strong 
asymmetry in conditional covariances. While I find this as a plausible explanation for the 
observed asymmetries between contemporaneous returns and conditional variances, I 
believe it would not predict the documented asymmetrical responses to earnings news 
shown in Table 2 because of the nature of my research design and controls. 
 A key feature of my research design is that I measure my change in the VIX prior 
to the event window in which I cumulate firm returns. The above mentioned feedback 
explanation only speaks to contemporaneous events, all asymmetric volatility effects 
under the CAPM framework should be instantaneously impounded into the 
contemporaneous price. In order for the effects to persist into the next period would 
imply some sort of market frictions where participants were unable to adjust price 
accordingly, but by requiring my sample to only include more liquid firms (i.e. stock 
price above $5 and no zero trading days) this explanation seems less plausible. While 
conceptual is seems implausible that volatility feedback explains my results in include as 
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controls both the contemporaneous market return (Retmrkt) measured from t-3 thru t+1. I 
also include the firm’s market beta (𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ) and the firms leverage ratio (Lev). 
 While my research design address concerns about asymmetric volatility, the 
potential for firm specific leverage effects to be present. Earnings announcements do 
provide news to investors (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968), depending on whether 
the news is good or bad the leverage (hence the risk) could change. Such an explanation 
though for the observed asymmetric response to earnings is doubtful primarily because 
such firm specific asymmetries should be observed also following a decrease in VIX 
which is not found in the documented results in Table 2. Still with the inclusion of Lev 
this effect should be controlled for. 
 Results after controlling for the leverage and feedback effects by including Retmrkt 
, 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 , and Lev are presented in Table 3. Consistent with predictions the incremental 
sign on BADNEWS*ΔVIX is positive and significant, indicating that more weight being 
placed on bad news in following an increase in VIX compared to following a decrease in 
VIX. The GOODNEWS*ΔVIX coefficient is negative but not statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. I test the asymmetry between good and bad news by using the total bad 
news coefficient (BADNEWS+BADNEWS*ΔVIX) and the total good news coefficient 
(GOODNEWS+GOODNEWS*ΔVIX). Results indicate that also consistent with 
predictions investors place significantly more weight on bad news than good news after 
experiencing an increase in VIX, i.e. (BADNEWS+BADNEWS*ΔVIX) > 
(GOODNEWS+GOODNEWS*ΔVIX) (p-value < 0.01). 
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4.2.2 Torpedo Effect 
 Skinner and Sloan (2002) document during earnings announcements unlike low 
market-to-book firms, high market-to-book firms experience more extreme responses to 
bad earnings news than good earnings news. The results are attributed to overoptimistic 
expectational errors (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and these are errors by 
investors are corrected at the subsequent earnings announcement through the earnings 
news. This empirical finding has been coined by the literature as the ‘torpedo effect’. For 
this explanation to plausible it would have to assume that increases in VIX partition firms 
in a way that increased the market-to-book for all firms. As shown in Table 1 the MTB 
for both increases and decreases are the same both statistically and economically. Under 
this observation if the ‘torpedo effect’ is driving the asymmetric results found I Table 2 
following an increase in VIX, the same effect would be seen following a decrease in 
VIX. So ex ante knowing the results in Tables 1 and 2 it would seem unlikely that effect 
is being driven by the market-to-book effect (‘torpedo effect’). 
 While it seems implausible that the market-to-book effect is driving the results I 
control for the market-to-book effect by including in (4) an indicator for high/low 
market-to-book and interact it with the bad and good earnings news. The results of this 
specification are presented in Table 4 column 1. After controlling for the effects of MTB 
the incremental coefficient on BADNEWS*ΔVIX is positive and significant at the <0.01 
level, while the GOODNEWS* ΔVIX coefficient is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Also a test of the differences in the total good and bad news coefficients 
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shows that following an increase in VIX investors place significantly more weight on bad 
news than on good news at the 0.01 level after controlling for MTB. 
4.2.3 State Risk: 
 Another alternative explanation for the observed asymmetry in the response to 
earnings news is that changes in VIX are capturing changes in states or state risk. In this 
section I test to see if the observed asymmetry can be attributed to state risk. Veronesi 
(1999) analyses a rational expectations model which includes an unobservable random 
state variable. By introducing a random state risk parameter into the denominator of the 
pricing function, Veronesi (1999) shows that risk averse Bayesian investors react more to 
bad news than good news when they ex ante believe they are in a good state. In addition, 
when investors believe ex ante they are in a bad state they react proportionately more to 
bad news than good news because observed good news in the bad state increases the risk 
that investors are in a good state. Thus, the Veronesi (1999) model predicts that investors 
respond the most to bad news in good states and respond the least to good news in bad 
states.  
 Although Veronesi (1999) models an aggregate market phenomenon, Conrad et 
al. (2002) adapts the model to the firm-level and empirically test whether the aggregate 
market state affects responses to firm-specific earnings news. As a proxy for the state of 
the market, Conrad et al. (2002) constructs a market P/E ratio every month and sorts 
firms by the market P/E ratio. They provide evidence that during high market P/E 
regimes investors respond more to bad news the good news, which is consistent with 
Veronesi (1999).  
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 Because the state risk argument also provides an asymmetry prediction, the 
asymmetric results following an increase in VIX might be attributable to state risk. 
However, note that the Veronesi (1999) model predicts the asymmetry in market 
response manifests during ‘good states’.18
𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑃𝑃
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅
= 1
�∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅
𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅
�𝑖𝑖={1,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅} ��  (5) 
 Following Conrad et al. (2002), I re-estimate 
(2) including a control for the state of the economy, the market P/E ratio. I construct the 
ratio as follows. First, using the last available quarterly earnings number for month t and 
the current shares outstanding as of month t, I construct earnings-per-share for each firm 
in each month t. Then using the newly constructed EPS and each firm’s price as of month 
t I compute the market P/E as follows: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  is the value of firm I relative to the total market value of firms available in the sample 
month t. 
Once the time series of Market P/E ratios are computed I compute the moving 12 
month average of Market P/E. I then take the difference between each month’s Market 
P/E and the 12 month moving average and call the difference – 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃/𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 . Conrad et 
al. (2002) classifies high (low) Diff P/E as good (bad) states. I include Diff P/E in (4) as 
both a main effect and interacted with BADNEWS and GOODNEWS.19
Results reported in the second column in Table 4 indicate that inclusion of the 
Diff P/E variable does not eliminate the asymmetric (symmetric) response following an 
  
                                                 
18 Under the ambiguity model, the asymmetric response manifests following an increase in VIX. It is not 
clear why increases in VIX would imply that the economy is in a ‘good state’. 
19 The variable Diff P/EMrkt is included in the regression as both continuous and an indicator variable. The 
results presented use a continuous variable of Diff P/EMrkt. In results not tabulated Diff P/Emrkt  is ranked 
high low in for the time series 
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increase (decrease) in VIX. In particular, results in the second column of Table 4 report 
that, after controlling for state risk, the incremental BADNEWS*ΔVIX 
(GOODNEWS*ΔVIX) coefficient is 0.3377 (-0.0708) and is statistically significant 
(insignificant). Moreover the total there is significant asymmetry (i.e., large response to 
the bad news than the good news) in the total coefficients at the <0.01 level.  
4.2.4 Investor Sentiment: 
  The final potential explanation for the observed asymmetry in the response to 
earnings news is that ∆VIX captures shifts in investor sentiment, and not changes in 
ambiguity. Prior literature has posited investor sentiment explains over- and under 
reactions to information.20 Baker and Wurgler (2006) empirically investigate the effects 
of investor sentiment in the cross-section of returns using an index created from the 
various sentiment proxies. They document that when sentiment is high assets are 
overpriced, and when sentiment is low assets are under priced. Using the measure 
developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2008) show that 
when sentiment is high (low) investors respond significantly more (less) to good than bad 
news.21
                                                 
20  Recently, Caskey (2008) uses an ambiguity framework to explain the over- and under reaction 
phenomenon as a function of ambiguity-averse investors preferring aggregate information to disaggregated 
information. 
 Thus, investor sentiment also produces asymmetry in investor reactions to news. 
However, unlike the asymmetry induced by ambiguity, investor sentiment asymmetry 
obtains in both high and low sentiment regimes, and overreactions to bad news in low 
sentiment regime flip to overreactions to good news in high sentiment regime. This 
21  Livant and Petrovits (2008) study reactions to earnings announcements and accruals in different 
sentiment regimes and find that holding firms with extreme good news during pessimistic sentiment 
periods earns higher excess returns than holding good news firms in optimistic sentiment periods.    
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contrasts with the maxmin framework where asymmetry is only observed following 
increases in VIX where bad news is weighted heavier than good news.  
 To control for investor sentiment, I re-estimate (4) including the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006, 2007) index (BW_Index) 22  at the beginning of the month of the 
announcement and interact it with the both the bad and good news coefficients in my 
regression. 23
 The last column in Table 4 shows that the inclusion of an investor sentiment 
proxy, much like the other alternative explanations, does not affect asymmetric 
inferences. Specifically increases in VIX lead the market to respond to bad and good 
news differently, placing more weight on the bad than the good.  
 The index is based on six measures of investor sentiment: NYSE share 
turnover, number of IPOs, closed-end fund discount, first day returns on IPOs, dividend 
premium, and share of equity issues in total debt and equity issues. To control for 
business cycles, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) regress each of the six measures on 
growth in the industrial production index, consumer durables, consumer nondurables and 
consumer services. After running the first stage regression, the index is computed as the 
first principle component of the residuals from the first stage regression. As before, I 
construct an indicator variable based on above and below median BW_Index and interact 
it with BADNEWS and GOODNEWS. Because the index only extends through 2005, my 
sample is limited to a shorter time period. 
                                                 
22 As alternative proxies for investor sentiment I use the put/call ratio and the consumer sentiment index. 
Untabulated findings indicate inferences are robust to both of these additional measures of investor 
sentiment. 
 
23 I also take the measurement at the end of the month that results are robust. 
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 To summarize the results in this section I find that after controlling for alternative 
explanations (i.e., leverage effects, feedback effects, market-to-book effects, state-risk, 
and investor sentiment), the asymmetric response to bad and good news following an 
increase in VIX is robust. On a final point, in Table 4 in each of the specifications none 
of the interaction effects are significant for the alternative explanation variables. This is a 
concern because of potential inadequacy of the controls. To examine this re-estimate all 
of the regressions in Table 4 and exclude on VIX related variables. In unreported results I 
am able to replicate prior findings providing support for the validity of the controls. 
  
 V.  Ambiguity Susceptibility 
I next examine whether some firms are more susceptible than others to the effects 
of ambiguity. As mentioned in section 2, it is plausible that the effects of ambiguity 
would be more pronounced for firms that have underlying earnings processes that are 
highly connected to the macro-environment. Examining differential susceptibility to the 
effects of ambiguity shocks in the cross-section gets at the idea that some firms have a 
greater potential to experience the effects of an ambiguity shock than others because of 
the underlying wealth generating process of the firm and its connection to the macro 
factors.   
To investigate this possibility, I test for cross-sectional variation in market 
responses to earnings information based on what I term ambiguity susceptibility 
characteristics. Specifically, I examine two attributes: the firm’s underlying earnings 
process as captured by earnings betas (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970) and a firm’s 
return co-variation with changes in VIX (Ang et al., 2006). Because the measured 
ambiguity (i.e., VIX) relates to macro- or general ambiguity, it is possible that the effects 
of such ambiguity would be more pronounced for firms for which the underlying 
earnings process is highly tied to the macro environment, i.e., firms with high earnings 
betas, and firms whose stocks co-vary the greatest with changes in VIX.  
I conduct my cross-sectional tests by splitting firms into different groups based on 
their ambiguity susceptibility characteristics. First, I compute earnings betas following 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970). Specifically I construct for each firm in the sample 
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an earnings surprise beta based on the prior 20 quarters by estimating the following 
regression model: 
𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸−𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸−𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  (6) 
 
where UE is unexpected earnings seasonally adjusted for firm i in quarter t. UE is then 
regressed on the on the average unexpected earnings for the market (not including firm i) 
and the average unexpected earnings for the two-digit sic industry to which firm i  
belongs (excluding firm i). I require that there be at least five other firms in an industry 
for it to be included. Both the market and industry metrics are measured 
contemporaneously at time t.24 To compute the firms’ earnings beta, 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  
are summed together.25
 My second ambiguity susceptibility characteristic is a firm’s return co-variation 
with changes in VIX. Following Ang et al. (2006), I use daily data obtained from the 
CRSP daily database over a twenty-day period ending ten days prior to the event window 
and estimate the following two factor model: 
 I create a dichotomous variable every quarter, where firms above 
the median are coded 1 and termed high 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 and firms below the median are coded 0 
and termed low 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 .   
(𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 − 𝑣𝑣𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 (𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑣𝑣𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅) + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  (7) 
 
                                                 
24 The earnings betas are constructed based on equally weighting firms when computing industry and 
market averages. Untabulated findings based on value weights indicate no change in inferences. 
 
25 In untabulated results I construct the earnings beta only using 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  and inference do not change. 
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The above model is a returns market model with the addition of the ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅  term.   ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅  
is defined as the one-day change in VIX measured contemporaneously with returns26
I predict that there will be cross-sectional variation in the asymmetric response to 
earnings information following changes in VIX. Specifically, I predict that for firms 
where the underlying earnings process has a large systematic component and for firms 
with high 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 , the effects of changes in ambiguity will be larger. On the other hand, 
following decreases in VIX, there should be symmetric responses regardless of the firm’s 
susceptibility to ambiguity. 
. 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉  can then be interpreted as a measure of a firm’s sensitivity or susceptibility to the 
effects of changes in ambiguity or to changes in the VIX.  
Table 5 and Table 6 provide the earnings beta and 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉   results. Table 5 shows 
that consistent with my predictions, the asymmetric response by the market obtains only 
for firms that have a large systematic component to their earnings process. Following an 
increase in VIX, the market response to bad news (0.9371) is significantly greater than 
the response to good news (0.5410) for firms with High 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 . For all other groups, the 
within group response to bad and good earnings news is statistically indistinguishable. 
Table 5 further points out that the difference in differences between ΔVIX+ and ΔVIX- 
(0.4408) is only significant (at the 0.05 level) within the high 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  group. Moreover for 
the high 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  group this change in difference is driven by a significant increase in the 
bad news coefficient. This result suggests that in the cross-section, ambiguity 
susceptibility varies with a firm’s earnings betas.  
                                                 
26 Untabulated results based on the sensitivity of two-day changes results in no change in inferences. 
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Results in Table 6 collaborates the evidence found in Table 5. Results in Table 6 
are attained by first partitioning 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉  into high and low, and then partitioning the 
observations by increases and decreases in VIX. I then estimate the model (3) for each of 
the 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 /∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 groups.
 The key observation in Table 6 is that the asymmetric response to 
bad and good earnings news is only found in the high 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉  group following an increase 
in VIX. Taken together, the results in Table 5 and 6 are consistent with the idea that firms 
with greater sensitivity to market-wide events are more susceptible to the effects of 
macro-ambiguity shocks. 
  
 VI. Trading Volume and the Bid-Ask Spread 
6.1 Trading Volume 
 The underpinning of the ambiguity hypothesis is that ambiguity-averse investors 
lack the relevant information to form unique priors. This section explores this idea more 
fully by examining whether the lack (presence) of information exacerbates (mitigates) the 
asymmetric effects of ambiguity. To test the effect of information, I use the presence or 
lack of trading volume (both firm specific and market wide) during the earnings 
announcement event window. Prior research has shown that trading volume is associated 
with information arrival (Beaver, 1968). Using the maxmin framework Dow and Werlang 
(1992) and Epstein and Schneider (2007) provide theoretical motivation for the relation 
between ambiguity and trading volume/market participation.27
Dow and Werlang (1992) use a special case of the maxmin framework to examine 
how ambiguity affects investors’ decision to participate in the market. They show that the 
lack of information (ambiguity) about the correct data-generating process creates a wedge 
between the price agents are willing to go long in an asset (ask price) and the price
 
                                                 
27 Billot, Chateauneaf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) also directly examine the relation between ambiguity and 
trading volume. Billot et al. (2000) use the maxmin framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to address 
trading under ambiguity, specifically with regard to agreement and disagreement among traders. Under the 
typically Bayesian framework investors only trade if there is disagreement on probabilities between 
investors. Billot et al. (2000) suggest that unlike the Bayesian model of agree/disagree, a model of 
ambiguity has shades of grey where ambiguity-averse investors may not agree in  the sense of having the 
same set of possible priors, but not disagree in the sense they are willing to take bets against each other. 
Billot et al. (2000) shows that in a multiple priors (maxmin) framework, if ambiguity-averse investors have 
at least one prior in common, then there is an absence of betting.  Bewley (2002) also provides a model of 
trading under ambiguity which uses the concept of ‘inertia’ instead of the maxmin model and finds similar 
results. 
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agents are willing to go short (bid price). This increased spread reduces the incentives for 
ambiguity-averse agents to participate in the market.  
Epstein and Schneider (2007) extend Dow and Werlang (1992) to an inter-
temporal setting and investigate how changes in ambiguity effect market participation 
Epstein and Schneider (2007) show that an increase in ambiguity leads ambiguity-averse 
investors to  away from market participation. This trend away from market participation 
reverses as the ambiguity shock is resolved. That is, following an increase in ambiguity 
the market initiates a learning process and to some extent resolves ambiguity through the 
gathering or revelation of ambiguity relevant information. This implies that the observed 
behavior of ambiguity-averse traders after increases in ambiguity will depend on how 
quickly and completely they discover the missing information that is the underlying 
driver of ambiguity. In the context of my study, after an increase in VIX it is possible that 
there will be no asymmetric responses to bad and good news because the missing 
information implied by the increase in VIX is quickly discovered and traded on 
immediately. In this case, we would observe symmetric responses to earnings news and 
high trading volume following an increase in VIX.  On the other, if missing information 
is not quickly discovered, we would observe asymmetric responses to bad and good news 
and low trading volume (low participation from ambiguity-averse traders).  
As another motivation for looking at the effects of volume on the asymmetric 
responses Easley and O’Hara (2009) show that when there are both Bayesian (i.e., 
ambiguity neutral) investor and ambiguity adverse investors non-participation in risky 
assets by the ambiguity adverse investor makes arbitrage impossible by the Bayesian 
investors even if they have the missing information. If low trading volume is associated 
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with non-participation by ambiguity investors then one would again expect the 
asymmetric effect only to be observed in the low volume sub-partition given an increase 
in ambiguity. 
 To investigate the relation between ambiguity and trading volume, I examine 
responses to bad and good news earnings news within partitions formed by classifying 
firms on the basis of abnormal trading volume during the earnings announcement 
window.  That is, I first partition firms on whether VIX increased or decreased just prior 
to the earnings announcement. Then, within each of these VIX partitions, I further 
partition firms into observed high and low abnormal volume over the three-day event 
window. I predict that the observed asymmetry in bad and good news responses will be 
most evident in the increase in VIX, low abnormal volume partition. The intuition is that 
following an ambiguity potential shock, if volume represents information arrival, then 
such information-based trading will resolve ambiguity and mute the asymmetric response 
to news.28
 One of the concerns with using raw volume is potential size effects (Chordia and 
Swaminathan, 2000). To eliminate these effects, I use turnover instead of trading volume, 
and moreover I use abnormal turnover (AbVol). To construct the AbVol measure, I first 
compute the firm’s average turnover (AvgVol). AvgVol is computed over fourteen 
contiguous trading days ending five trading days prior to the first quarterly announcement 
in firm i’s industry in the current fiscal quarter. This ‘average’ period is chosen to 
 
                                                 
28 While an increase in VIX potentially reflect ambiguity it is not possible to distinguish whether the lack 
of an asymmetric response is attributable to resolution of ambiguity or the absence of ambiguity from the 
start. Therefore I interpret the high volume results with caution. 
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mitigate the effects of other news distorting the firm’s normal or average turnover. 
Therefore over this period a firm’s average turnover is computed as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = 114 ∑ log �� 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠� + 0.00000255�−1𝑠𝑠=−14                            (8) 
 
where Sharestraded is the total numbers of firm i’s shares traded on day s, and 
ShareOutstanding is the total number of shares outstanding for firm i on day s.  
Following prior research a small constant is added on to avoid taking the log of zero. In a 
similar manner I compute the cumulative abnormal turnover, or AbVol, for the event 
window, t-1 to t+1 where t is the quarter earnings announcement. Specifically AbVol is 
calculated in the following manner: 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = ∑ �log �� 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 � + 0.00000255� − 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 �1𝑅𝑅=−1                      (9) 
 
I then rank firm quarter observations by AbVol, creating a dichotomous variable equal to 
1 (0) for firm quarter observation that is above (below) the median. The new 
dichotomous variable is referred to as AbVolHIGH for firm quarters above the median and 
AbVolLOW for firm quarters below the median. 
AbVol can be characterized as a relative ranking among firms, but my prediction 
should hold with a more general measure of volume.  As a more general measure of 
volume, I compute the abnormal market trading volume during the three-day event 
window. Unlike AbVol, abnormal market volume (AbMVol) is not a turnover measure but 
instead using raw volume. AbMVol is calculated as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = ∑ [𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅]1𝑅𝑅=−1                     (10) 
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where MarketVolume is the total number of share traded in the S&P 500 on day t. 
AvgMarketVolume is the average number of shares traded on the S&P 500 over the 
period t-40 to t-20.29
 Table 7 reports the results of the primary prediction on trading volume. Using 
abnormal turnover as a proxy for the presence of information, I find that for firms that 
experience low abnormal turnover (lack of relevant information) over the event window 
show a strong asymmetric response, with a bad news coefficient of 0.7624 and a good 
news coefficient of 0.2538. Both coefficients are statistically different from zero and are 
statistically different from each other (difference of 0.5086 with a p-value < 0.001). Also, 
consistent with my prediction, firms that experience high abnormal turnover (relevant 
ambiguity information is present) have symmetric responses to bad and good news.
 I again create a dichotomous variable equal to 1 (0) for firm quarter 
earnings announcement windows where there is AbMVol above (below) the median. The 
new dichotomous variable is referred to as AbMVolHIGH for firm quarters above the 
median and AbMVolLOW for firm quarters below the median. 
30
 Tests on the difference in differences for each volume sub-group shows that there 
is an increase in the asymmetry for only the AbVolLow sub-group when going from ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉− 
to ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ . The difference goes from 0.0437 to 0.5086 which is an increase in the 
difference between BADNEWS and GOODNEWS moving from ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−  to ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+ of 
0.4650 (p-value < 0.01). Moreover, the test of changes in the BADNEWS and 
  
                                                 
29 The window over which I estimate AvgMarketVolume is arbitrary, untabulated results indicate that 
inferences are the same when using different time windows to calculate AvgMarketVolume. 
 
30  As mentioned above an alternative explanation for the high volume result is that there never was 
ambiguity present in the increase in VIX. Again as mentioned above whether ambiguity was resolved or 
never present the basic inference is similar i.e., no ambiguity – no asymmetric response. 
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GOODNEWS coefficients show that in addition to a significant increase (0.3123, p-value 
< 0.05) in the BADNEWS coefficient there is a significant decrease (-0.1526, p-value < 
0.05) in the GOODNEWS coefficient. 
 Table 8 present the results on the market abnormal volume split. Similar to the 
AbVol analysis, the asymmetric response is only present in the low market volume group 
following an increase in VIX. Specifically for a low abnormal market volume 
announcement following an increase in VIX the BADNEWS coefficient is 1.2792 and the 
GOODNEWS coefficient is 0.7363. Both the BADNEWS and GOODNEWS coefficients 
are significantly different from zero and are also significantly different from each other. 
Similar to the AbVol analysis the additional test of asymmetry collaborate this finding. 
Table 7 and Table 8 together provide preliminary evidence of a link between ambiguity 
and trading volume.  
Finally, to further explore the effects of ambiguity shocks on decision making I 
revisit the earnings beta cross-sectional results. In Tables 7 and 8 we see that the lack of 
volume exacerbate the effects of ambiguity, while Table 5 results indicate that ambiguity 
responses vary cross-sectionally based on differences in earnings betas.. This suggests 
that the asymmetry found in Table 5 would only be present in low volume periods 
following increase in VIX. To test this prediction I sort observations on earnings beta and 
on AbVol and then re-estimate the analysis for each of the subgroups.31
                                                 
31 In unreported results I use AbMVol instead of AbVol and inferences are the same. 
 Table 9 presents 
the results of the analysis. The asymmetric response is contained only in one group 
(ΔVIX+/ High βEarn / AbVolLow) where the BADNEWS coefficient is 0.8333 and the 
reported GOODNEWS coefficient is 0.1563. Again both coefficients are statistically 
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greater than zero and statistically different from each other. Results in Table 9 provide 
further evidence that there is an important link between shocks in ambiguity and 
observed trading volume.  
6.2 Bid-Ask Spread 
Dow and Werlang (1992) predict that, in addition to ambiguity reducing market 
participantion, ambiguity shocks will increase the observed bid-ask spread. Camerer and 
Weber (1992) also suggest that any shock in ambiguity would result in increased bid-ask 
spreads. To test the effects of changes in ambiguity on the bid-ask spread I use the 
following empirical design: 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 +
𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀 (11) 
 
where BidAskSpread is the average daily bid-ask spread for the firm over the three day 
event window around the earnings announcement. I use two different ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 variables 
(11). The first is an indicator set to 1 if the two day change in VIX prior to the event 
window is a positive value and 0 otherwise. The second measure, ExVIX is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if the change in VIX is in the top decile of the change in VIX distribution 
and 0 otherwise. I use the ExVIX measure because as shown in Figure 2 the extremes is 
where there is more ambiguity potential. VIX is the average level of the VIX over the 
prior week to the event window. Because Ng (2007) shows that an extreme earnings 
surprises affect the bid-ask spread, I include EXUE as a control for the effect. ExUE is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s UE (defined above) is ranked in the top quintile of 
the distribution of UE, and 0 otherwise. I include LnPrice, which is the natural logarithm 
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of the average price over the event window. I calculate AvgSpread by taking the firm’s 
average bid-ask spread over the prior month to the earnings announcement. I also include 
AbVol which is defined as the abnormal turnover for the firm over the event window.  
 Table 10 presents the results on the effects of ambiguity on the bid-ask spread 
using only an indicator for increases and decreases in VIX. The estimate coefficient for a 
generic increase in VIX increases the average bid-ask spread over the three day window 
by 8 basis points. Table 10 also reports the estimates again ExVIX. Again the estimated 
coefficient on ExVIX is statistically significant and the economic magnitude is around 23 
basis points. Both results in Table 10 provide evidence consistent with Dow and Werlang 
(1992). 
  
 VII.   Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is to test empirically if changes in ambiguity affect 
investors’ decision making process consistent with prior theoretical predicts and 
experimental research. Using changes in VIX as an empirical proxy for ambiguity, I find 
that following an increase in VIX there is a significant asymmetric response to earnings 
news. Specifically I find that investors weight bad earnings news more heavily than good 
earnings news. On the other hand I find that following a decrease in VIX investors weight 
bad and good earnings news symmetrically.  
I find that my asymmetric (symmetric) result following increases (decreases) in 
VIX is robust to controls for investor sentiment and state risk. The observed asymmetric 
response following an increase in ambiguity and symmetric response following decrease 
in ambiguity is consistent with prior theories of ambiguity (Epstein and Schneider, 2008; 
Hansen and Sargent, 2008) and experimental results (Ellsberg, 1961).  
In addition, I also find that the effects vary in the cross-section by firm 
characteristics that make a firm more susceptible to the effects of an ambiguity shock. I 
find that the asymmetric response is more pronounced for firms that have underlying 
earnings processes that have a large systematic component. I also find that firms with 
returns that are more sensitive to change in VIX are more susceptible to the effects of 
changes in ambiguity. 
I also investigate the interplay between trading volume and the observed 
asymmetric response to earnings news. Using abnormal trading volume (both firm-
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specific and market-wide) as an ex post proxy for information arrival, I find that for firms 
that experience low (high) levels of volume after an increase in ambiguity, the observed 
asymmetric response is exacerbated (mitigated). This results is suggestive of a link 
between ambiguity, information and trading volume. As a final test I document evidence 
that ambiguity shocks lead to increased bid-ask spreads consistent with predictions by 
Dow and Werlang (1992).  
 In this paper I provide large scale empirical evidence that changes in ambiguity 
affect how investors process the same information consistent with both experimental and 
theoretical predictions. These results provide insights into the fundamental workings of 
complex capital markets. The results also suggest a fundamental economic reason for 
observed asymmetric responses to accounting information. 
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX index measured over the two day prior to the 
announcement window is positive (negative). RET is the cumulative market adjust return over the three day 
earnings announcement window (t-1 to t+1), where the market is the return on a value weighted market 
portfolio. Unexpected earnings (UE) is calculated using a seasonally adjusted random walk [(EBITt-4 – 
EBITt)/Average Assets] BadNews is computed as the  firm’s UE multiplied by an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the unexpected earnings are less than 0 and 0 otherwise. GoodNews is constructed in the same 
manner as BadNews with the exception that UE is multiplied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
unexpected earnings are greater than 0 and 0 otherwise (Conrad et al., 2002). VIX is the average level of the 
VIX index the week prior to the event window. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of 
equity measured at the end of the quarter. Retpre is the firm’s cumulative abnormal return computed over the 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement. MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured at quarter end. 
Analyst is the number of analyst following the firm during the quarter. AbVol is the  is calculated as 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = ∑ �log �𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 + 0.00000255�𝑅𝑅 − log ��𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 �𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 + 0.00000255��1𝑅𝑅=−1  where est is 
the ten day trading period ending five trading days prior to the first quarterly earnings announcement for 
the industry in which firm i is a part of. Lev is the firm’s leverage, computed as total debt over total assets 
as of the end of the quarter. 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  is defined as the firm’s beta from a regression of  firm returns on market 
returns computed over the prior twenty days leading up to the event window. Persistence is defined as the 
coefficient from a seasonally adjusted AR(1) regression over a twenty quarter rolling window ending the 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement. 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  is defined by first regressing a firm’s UE and the 
Markets UE and Industry UE, where the market and industry UE are calculated excluding firm i. The 
coefficients are the market and industry variables are then summed together. The regression is run over a 
twenty quarter rolling window ending on the prior quarter. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  is the market return computed over the 
window t-4 to t+1.  
 
              **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.  
Variables Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Ret 0.0049 0.0487 0.0038 0.0488 -0.0011 ***
BadNews -0.0017 0.0036 -0.0016 0.0036 0.0000
GoodNews 0.0060 0.0078 0.0060 0.0076 0.0000
VIX 20.3811 7.9896 19.3395 6.8652 -1.0416 **
Size 7.1053 1.5142 7.0753 1.5221 -0.0300 **
Ret Pre 0.0105 0.2110 0.0133 0.4363 0.0027
MTB 2.4111 1.5911 2.4341 1.6268 0.0230
Analyst 7.5831 5.9706 7.4267 5.9740 -0.1564 **
AbVol 1.0531 2.2168 1.0489 2.2264 -0.0041
Lev 0.4290 0.1762 0.4305 0.1755 0.0014
β Mrkt 0.8503 0.8005 0.8164 0.8221 -0.0340 **
Persistence 0.4941 0.4254 0.4967 0.4308 0.0026
β Earn 0.7657 3.2743 0.7737 3.3670 0.0080
Ret Mrkt 0.0102 0.0198 -0.0016 0.0238 -0.0117 ***
ΔVIX+−ΔVIX−
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+ Difference
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Table 2 
Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise under Ambiguity 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX 
index measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative). For all other 
variable definitions see Table I. Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors clustered both 
along the firm and time dimension.  
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables
BadNews 0.6357 *** 0.9359 *** 0.6549 *** 0.9715 ***
GoodNews 0.6619 *** 0.5997 *** 0.6975 *** 0.6210 ***
VIX -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 ** -0.0001
Size -0.0009 *** 0.0002 -0.0010 *** -0.0002
Ret Pre -0.0113 *** -0.0033 ** -0.0108 *** -0.0032
MTB -0.0011 *** -0.0009 ***
Analyst 0.0002 ** 0.0003 ***
N
Test of Asymmetry
   BadNews = GoodNews 0.0262 0.3362 *** 0.0425 0.3505 ***
   Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX *** ***
Test of Changes
** **0.3001
-0.0622
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.3623 0.3931
Dependent Variable: Ret
0.3165
-0.0765
I II
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
27,188 23,79027,188 23,790
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
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Table 3 
Alternative Explanations for Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise 
under Ambiguity: Leverage and Feedback Effects 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX index 
measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative). For all other variable 
definitions see Table I. For the below regression 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 , 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and Lev are all indicator variables coded 
1(0) if the value is rank above (below) the median. Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors 
clustered both along the firm and time dimension. 
 
 
 
 
      **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables Prediction
BadNews 0.7779 ***
GoodNews 0.5443 ***
ΔVIX -0.0004
BadNews*ΔVIX + 0.2788 **
GoodNews*ΔVIX − -0.0271
VIX -0.0001 **
Size -0.0004 ***
Ret Pre -0.0050 **
Ret Mrkt -0.0010
BadNews*Ret Mrkt -0.2502
GoodNews*Ret Mrkt 0.2173 ***
Lev -0.0023 ***
BadNews*Lev 0.0018
GoodNews*Lev 0.1499 **
β Mrkt 0.0010
BadNews*β Mrkt -0.0586
GoodNews*β Mrkt -0.1522 **
N
Ret
Dependent Variable:
50,978
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Table 4 
Alternative Explanations for Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise 
under Ambiguity: Risk and Sentiment 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX index 
measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative). DiffPE is the 
difference between each month’s PE and the previous 12 month average monthly PE (Conrad et al., 2002). 
BW_Index is the Baker and Wurgler (2005, 2006) investor sentiment index for the month of the earnings 
announcement. For all other variable definitions see Table I. For the below regression𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, DiffPE and 
BW_Index are all indicator variables coded 1(0) if the value is rank above (below) the median. Year fixed 
effects are included with the standard errors clustered both along the firm and time dimension. 
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables Prediction
BadNews 0.7113 *** 0.6235 *** 0.5624 ***
GoodNews 0.7349 *** 0.6474 *** 0.6859 ***
ΔVIX -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
BadNews*ΔVIX + 0.3377 *** 0.3401 *** 0.3910 ***
GoodNews*ΔVIX − -0.0708 -0.0734 -0.1109
VIX -0.0002 -0.0004 ** -0.0003 ***
Size -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001
Ret Pre -0.0049 ** -0.0050 ** -0.0047 **
MTB -0.0025 ***
BadNews*MTB -0.2351
GoodNews*MTB -0.0681
DiffPE -0.0003
BadNews*DiffPE -0.0227
GoodNews*DiffPE 0.0304
BW_Index -0.0004
BadNews*BW_Index 0.0259
GoodNews*BW_Index -0.0209
N 46,832
Dependent Variable: Ret
50,978 50,978
Skinner/Sloan Risk Sentiment
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Table 5 
Ambiguity Susceptibility and Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise 
under Ambiguity: Earnings Beta 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX 
index measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative). For all other 
variable definitions see Table I. High (low) 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 are firm quarter observation where their 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  is above 
below the median 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 . Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors clustered both along the 
firm and time dimension. 
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
  
Variables
BadNews 0.7217 *** 0.5897 *** 0.9539 *** 0.9371 ***
GoodNews 0.6952 *** 0.6344 *** 0.6630 *** 0.5410 ***
VIX -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 **
Size -0.0008 *** -0.0009 *** 0.0003 0.0001
Ret Pre -0.0155 *** -0.0091 *** -0.0030 -0.0040
N
Test of Asymmetry
0.0264 0.0448 0.2909 0.3960 **
  High βEarn :  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX **
  Low βEarn :  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX
**
Test of Changes Low β Earn :
**
Dependent Variable: Ret
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
Low βEarn High βEarn Low βEarn High βEarn
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.3474
-0.0934
Test of Changes High β Earn :
-0.0322
0.4408
0.2644
11,776
  BadNews = GoodNews
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.2322
13,625 13,563 12,014
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Table 6 
Ambiguity Susceptibility and Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise 
under Ambiguity: VIX Beta 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX 
index measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative). For all other 
variable definitions see Table I. βΔVIX is the VIX beta computed by running the following regression 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑣𝑣𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ,where Return is the firm i’s excess return for day t, Mrkt is 
the excess market return for day t and ΔVIX is the daily change in the VIX index. The regression is run over 
twenty trading days ending ten trading days prior to the event window. Each regression requires a full 
twenty days. High (low) 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉are firm quarter observation where their 𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉  is above below the median 
𝛽𝛽∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 . Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors clustered both along the firm and time 
dimension. 
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables
BadNews 0.6272 *** 0.6420 *** 0.8908 *** 1.0164 ***
GoodNews 0.6736 *** 0.6541 *** 0.6454 *** 0.5815 ***
VIX -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
Size -0.0007 ** -0.0011 *** 0.0002 0.0003
Ret Pre -0.0113 ** -0.0112 *** -0.0186 *** -0.0023 **
N
Test of Asymmetry
0.0464 0.0121 0.2454 0.4348 ***
  High βΔVIX :  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX **
  Low βΔVIX :  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX
**
Test of Changes Low β ΔVIX :
Dependent Variable: Ret
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
Low βΔVIX High βΔVIX Low βΔVIX High βΔVIX
13,609 13,579
  BadNews = GoodNews
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
Test of Changes High β ΔVIX :
0.4469
0.2918
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.3743
-0.0726
0.2636
-0.0283
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
11,858 11,932
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Table 7 
The Examination of the Effects of Information (Abnormal Firm Volume) on 
Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise under Ambiguity 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX 
index measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative).  For all other 
variable definitions see Table I. High (low) AbVol are firm quarter observation where their AbVol is above 
below the median AbVol. Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors clustered both along the 
firm and time dimension. 
 
 
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables
BadNews 0.4501 *** 0.8650 *** 0.7624 *** 1.2063 ***
GoodNews 0.4064 *** 0.7971 *** 0.2538 *** 0.8511 ***
VIX 0.0000 -0.0003 ** -0.0002 ** 0.0000
Size 0.0004 -0.0019 *** 0.0012 *** -0.0008 **
Ret Pre -0.0138 ** -0.0108 *** -0.0020 ** -0.0243 ***
N
Test of Asymmetry
0.0437 0.0679 0.5086 *** 0.3552
  High AbVol:  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX
  Low AbVol:  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX **
Test of Changes AbVolHigh:
Test of Changes AbVolLow:
**
**
0.2873
0.4650
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
Dependent Variable: Ret
13,764 13,424 12,162 11,628
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
AbVolLow AbVolHigh AbVolLow AbVolHigh
  BadNews = GoodNews
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.3412
0.0540
0.3123
-0.1526
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Table 8 
The Examination of the Effects of Information (Abnormal Market Volume) on 
Investors’ Asymmetric Response to Earnings Surprise under Ambiguity 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependent variable Ret is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over the event window (t-1 to t+1) 
where t is the earnings announcement date. ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉+(∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−) is coded as a 1(0) if the change in the VIX 
index measured over the two day prior to the announcement window is positive (negative).  For all other 
variable definitions see Table I. High (low) AbMVol are observation where their AbMVol is above below 
the median AbMVol. Year fixed effects are included with the standard errors clustered both along the firm 
and time dimension. 
 
 
 
 **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Variables
BadNews 0.7879 *** 0.5477 *** 1.2792 *** 0.8057 ***
GoodNews 0.7585 *** 0.6251 *** 0.7363 *** 0.5608 ***
VIX -0.0001 -0.0002 ** -0.0001 -0.0002
Size -0.0006 -0.0010 *** 0.0001 0.0002
Ret Pre -0.0223 *** -0.0096 *** -0.0304 *** -0.0025 **
Test of Asymmetry
0.0295 0.0774 0.5429 *** 0.2448
  High AbMVol:  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX
  Low AbMVol:  Asymmetry DVIX =Asymmetry UVIX **
Test of Changes AbMVolHigh:
**
Test of Changes AbMVolLow:
**
N
  BadNews = GoodNews
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  BadNews:   ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
  GoodNews: ΔVIX − = ΔVIX + 
0.2580
Dependent Variable: Ret
AbMVolLow AbMVolHigh AbMVolLow AbMVolHigh
ΔVIX− ΔVIX+
0.3222
0.5135
-0.0222
9,645 17,543 7,442 16,348
-0.0643
0.4912
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  **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 10 
Increases in Ambiguity and the Effect on the Bid-Ask Spread 
 
The sample period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. Return data is collected 
from CRSP and all firm specific financial data is collected from Compustat. The announcement window is 
defined as day t-1 to t+1 and the window is centered on the quarterly earnings announcement. The 
dependant variable is the average bid-ask spread for the event window. ΔVIX is an indicator variable set to 
1 if the change in VIX is positive and 0 otherwise. ExVIX is an indicator variable set to 1 if the change in 
VIX is in the top decile of the distribution of changes in VIX. ExUE is defined as an indicator variable set 
to 1 if the firm’s UE (defined above) is ranked in the top quintile of the distribution of UE, and 0 otherwise. 
I include LnPrice which is the natural log of the average price over the event window. I also include AbVol 
which is defined as the abnormal turnover for the firm over the event window. standard errors clustered 
both along the firm and time dimension. 
 
 
 
         **, *** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
ΔVIX 0.0007 **
ExVIX 0.0023 ***
VIX 0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***
ExUE 0.0028 *** 0.0028 ***
LnPrice -0.0045 *** -0.0045 ***
AvgSpread 0.6252 *** 0.6248 ***
AbVol 0.0032 *** 0.0032 ***
N
R2
Dependent Variable: Spread
50,978 50,978
40.32% 40.46%
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Figure 1 
Time Series of the VIX and the ΔVIX (1986 ~ 2007) 
 
Below present the time series of the VIX index for the sample period 1986-2007. The VIX index is 
collected by the Chicago Board Option Exchange from the 1986 to present. The VIX index is constructed 
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), and represents the implied volatility of at-the-money 
option for the S&P100 index with a maturity of 1 month. Specifically it is calculated from eight S&P100 
index calls and puts and takes into account the American features of the option contracts, discrete cash 
dividends, and microstructure frictions such as bid-ask spreads. Panel A presents the level of the index 
whereas Panel B show the times series of the two-day change.  
 
       Panel A 
 
 
       Panel B  
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Figure 2  
Plot of GOODNEWS and BADNEWS Coefficients across Quintiles of ΔVIX 
 
Below is the plot of the GOODNEWS and BADNEWS coefficients across ΔVIX Quintiles. The sample 
period for quarterly earnings announcements is from 1986 to 2007. The announcement window is defined 
as day -1 to day +1 of the quarterly earnings announcement. The dark line is the BADNEWS or bad news 
coefficient across quintiles. The lighter line is the GOODNEWS or good news coefficient across quintiles. 
As an indicator of significant difference a filled box indicates the BADNEWS and GOODNEWS 
coefficients are significantly different at the 0.01 level.  
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